This commentary was published on page A9 of the 26-28 September 2003 edition of the Asian Wall Street Journal.

The Real Cancun
by Celso Amorim

BRASILIA — The Cancun Ministerial Conference did not produce consensus. Discussions among member states of the World Trade Organization remain inconclusive and will have to be taken up by delegations at the WTO’s headquarters in Geneva. Although the absence of agreement on modalities for moving forward is a disappointment, in one fundamental aspect Cancun can be seen as positive: Attempts by major trading powers to dilute the Doha mandate on agriculture did not prosper, and the voice of the developing world was taken into consideration.

The question here is not whether a modest outcome would have been better than the absence of results. The real dilemma that many of us had to face was whether it was sensible to accept an agreement that would essentially consolidate the policies of the two subsidizing superpowers — with very modest gains and even some steps backward (the new, broader definition of “blue box” subsidies to accommodate the U.S. for instance) — and then have to wait for another 15 or 18 years to launch a new round, after having spent precious bargaining chips.

As coordinator of the Group of 22 developing countries that presented a united front on agriculture, I am convinced that Cancun will be remembered as the conference that signalled the emergence of a less autocratic multilateral trading system. In Brazil, and in a host of developing countries large and small — which represent 69% of the world’s farmers — Cancun has been hailed as a turning point.

Let me be clear. We are not interested in North-South confrontation. To use an expression made popular by trade negotiators when combating protectionism under its many guises, our platform is about “leveling the playing field,” through the full integration of agriculture into the multilateral rules-based trading system. It is about addressing in a decisive manner the most important unfinished business of the Uruguay Round (should I say, business that was never seriously taken up?). It is about honoring the terms of the Doha Development Agenda in an area unanimously viewed as its centerpiece.

Two years ago at Doha, member states agreed to substantially improve market access, phase out export subsidies and substantially reduce distorting domestic support in agriculture. The so called “mandated negotiations” required by Article 20 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture had come to a standstill. Certain trading powers insisted that, in the absence of a new round — with a broad agenda including industrial goods, services and rules on new topics such as investment, competition, trade and environment — it would not be possible to liberalize their agricultural regimes.

After the Seattle debacle in 1999, this reasoning gained increasing acceptance, and in 2001 political conditions finally allowed for the launching of a round at the WTO Ministerial in the capital of Qatar, It is important to underline, however, that the trade liberalizing exercise launched at Doha represented a long overdue collective commitment to do away with protectionist barriers and trade distorting policies in an area of vital importance to competitive exporters from both the developed and the developing world.

As I had the occasion of stressing in Cancun, no other area of trade is subject to such blatant discrimination as agriculture. Distortions in agricultural trade not only harm efficient exporters by denying them market opportunities. Domestic and export subsidies in developed countries depress prices and incomes throughout the world, cut into export earnings,and increase food insecurity in developing countries. Their addictive nature does not contribute to productivity gains or the creation of wealth. They only generate dependence, on one side, and deprivation on the other.

Contrary to what some have said, ours is not a maximalist agenda. In fact, our “offensive” objectives are very similar to those the U.S. used to advance until quite recently. Indeed, these are the sort of proposals the U.S promoted when I was head of the Brazilian delegation in Geneva and was nominated (by the U.S.!) to chair the Agriculture Committee of the WTO. In Cancun, even after we made a genuine effort to accommodate the interests of our broad based constituency of developing nations, I would venture to calculate that between 70% and 80% of our proposals corresponded almost literally to what the U.S. upheld until not very long ago. Cancun did not fail on account of agriculture. We were ready to negotiate in earnest. We had prepared amendments for the last text brought to the negotiating table. Our approach was recognized even by those on the other side as “businesslike.”

As we resume negotiations in Geneva — hopefully with a lighter agenda as regards the “Singapore issues” — may we bear in mind the lessons of Cancun. The G-22 and other developing countries will not be reduced to the role of supporting actors in discussions that affect their development prospects. Consensus cannot be imposed through pre-cooked deals that disregard previous commitments and ignore the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the world’s population. Trade must be a tool not only to create wealth but also to distribute it in a more equitable way.

We are confident that a virtuous alliance among those who support free trade and economic development throughout the globe will prevail in steering the Doha Round to a successful outcome, in line with the promises raised at its inception. Brazil will be working actively with all WTO trading partners to make this possible.

Mr. Amorim is the foreign minister of Brazil.

Posted on September 26th, 2003 by jl
Filed under: WTO