This article appeared on page 29 of the Australian on 24 November 2004.

We can’t afford to ignore the neighbours

Australia’s future could become shaky unless its once formidable expertise on Asia is rebuilt, argues Michael Wesley

IT’S almost certain that in 15 years Australia’s position in the region will be more difficult to manage than it is now.

Many analysts suggest that by 2019 China will be the largest economy in the world or will have entered a period of internal failure and crisis. Japan will probably have emerged into a much more normal great power role, most likely in competition with China.

Southeast Asia is likely to have moved closer economically and politically to one or both of the great north Asian powers.

India will possibly be playing a much more central regional role. The US is unlikely to be comfortable with a reduced capacity to determine regional outcomes.

Australia will probably face challenges that will call into question its security, identity and prosperity in ways much more profound and enduring than before.

And if present trends continue, Australia will be less able to understand the changes in its region or the implications they have for its society.

Traditionally, Australia has had a world-class intellectual infrastructure for the study of Asia. Great scholars such as C.P. Fitzgerald, A.L. Basham and Herb Feith revolutionised their respective fields and trained generations of Asianists.

Australia sent its best diplomats to Tokyo, Beijing, Jakarta and Bangkok. Our diplomatic and intelligence expertise was highly valued and consistently sought by allies in Washington, London and elsewhere. The bargaining chip that gave Australia a seat at the great councils of the West was Asia expertise and access.

And as Asia seemed to be rising and sorting out all its problems on the back of a limitless wave of growth, students in schools and universities were flocking to Asian studies courses.

But things started to fall apart in the mid-1990s.

First, Asia was turned into an issue: of partisan competition, of identity, of destiny. Australia’s relationship with its region became entangled with issues such as the republic, reconciliation and multiculturalism. Our relations with Asia were turned from a reality into competing slogans.

Second, the Asian financial crisis had a serious and still largely unresearched impact on Australia’s collective psyche. Because so much interest in Asia had been hooked on the bait of “Asia rising” and the prosperity that would come with it, when Asia lost prosperity many Australians’ interest collapsed.

This sort of disillusionment was bound to occur. The first strains were apparent before the Asian financial crisis, as Australian companies tried to make quick money in Asian markets and found the quick profits just weren’t there.

Asia is now seen as just too risky. As a result, we’ve seen the silent collapse of a national asset: Asian studies.

As John Fitzgerald, Robin Jeffery, Kama Maclean and Tessa Morris-Suzuki record in their 2002 report for the Asian Studies Association of Australia, student interest in Asian studies — other than in the study of Chinese — plummeted in the late ’90s and has never recovered.

Universities began closing down Asian studies courses, then whole areas of specialisation.

The bellwether was the study of Indonesian, arguably Australia’s most pressing Asia-skills priority. Before the Asian financial crisis and East Timor, student numbers in Indonesian language, politics and society courses were strong. At the University of NSW, where I formerly taught, we were seeing first-year Indonesian classes of 50 to 60 during the early to mid-’90s.

After these two events, the numbers fell — sometimes leaving fewer than 10 students in first year.

After 2005, UNSW will be the only university in Sydney that teaches Indonesian.

As a result, Australia’s academic supply of Asia scholars is drying up. Faced with dropping student demand, universities have started closing, shrinking or merging Asian studies departments. Retiring scholars are not being replaced.

This hollowing-out will continue: according to the ASAA report, nearly half the Asia scholars surveyed were older than 50 and 75 per cent were over 40. With the twin decline in teachers and student numbers, even if Australian universities want to replace or rebuild this expertise, the local talent just won’t be there.

And because of Australian academic salaries, it’s unlikely they’ll be able to lure talent from Europe, Asia and North America, where some of our top Asianists have gone in the past five years.

This is Australia’s new Asia crisis. It would be as if European studies had collapsed in Germany; only I doubt whether German society and government would be as complacent about it as we are.

If Australia doesn’t turn this situation around, in the short term it will lose its strategic, diplomatic, commercial and academic edge in and on Asia. In the long term, it will lack the capacity to position itself in a region that is becoming a centre of gravity in global strategic and economic affairs.

In diplomatic terms, the next decade is likely to see China, Japan, and probably India competing for regional management roles.

The old US-defined and guaranteed regional order will increasingly face a challenge, and it’s unlikely Washington will acquiesce in a less dominant regional role.

The three big powers will start to change not only the substance of regional relations but the style of diplomatic practice.

Asian countries are likely to continue to change politically during the next decade, but not all in the same direction. Social and demographic change in almost every country of East and South Asia is challenging political structures and leading to experiments with various forms of democracy and authoritarian pluralism.

In many of the countries to our north and west, there is vigorous discussion not only about structures but also about values such as pluralism, secularism, power and legitimacy, yet our political science departments remain focused primarily on Western political history.

Australia needs its Asia expertise. By rebuilding this national asset, Australia would acquire a powerful diplomatic and strategic asset. Exploiting our potential to build detailed and intimate knowledge of all of the countries in our region would enhance our ability to engage with the region and increase our value in the region.

Interest in Asia needs to be rebuilt — and on stronger foundations than that there’s money or jobs in it.

Asia needs to be discussed in bigger terms, in terms of the broad political, socioeconomic and cultural trends shaping the region. There needs to be a much clearer link drawn between Australia’s future and that of Asia.

Understanding the outside world is not just enriching to Australia, it’s crucial to understanding Australia.

Michael Wesley is director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University. This is an edited extract from a paper he delivered to the institute last week.

  

Posted on December 1st, 2004 by jl
Filed under: Regionalisation